Showing posts with label Trial. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Trial. Show all posts

Character Evidence on Trial

In the same way the marketplace thrives on money, evidence is the currency in court. This is because courts have no basis to apply the law without evidence. Today New Jersey, like other jurisdictions, has codified its Rules of Evidence. In a criminal trial, the State carries the burden of proof. This means the State must prove all of its evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, showing the defendant is the one who committed the offense at a particular time in a particular place in a particular way. The accused, generally speaking, does not have to prove anything.

This article is about a Florida man, Edward Ates, on trial for homicide in New Jersey. The State alleges he shot the victim as an expert marksman. The defendant maintains this was impossible because he was too fat.

Getting the evidence of the defendant's girth in front of the jury requires both skill as a trial advocate, and knowledge of the law of Evidence. What follows is a rudimentary legal analysis.

First, all relevant evidence is admissible unless an exclusionary rule applies. "Relevant evidence" makes the existence of a disputed fact more likely or less likely. N.J.R.E. 401. The dispute in this trial is whether Edward Ates did, in fact, murder his son-in-law. The State wants to show Mr. Ates is the one who did it by firing a weapon at the victim. Mr. Ates wants to introduce evidence of his weight at the time his son-in-law was killed, 285 pounds, because it goes to the heart of the defense theory that he could not have run up a flight of stairs and accurately fired a weapon at a target. Therefore, this evidence is relevant because it makes it less likely Mr. Ates committed this crime. Relevance, however, is only the first step.

Second, character evidence, though relevant, is generally excludible. N.J.R.E. 404(a). As indicated above, relevant evidence is admissible unless an exclusionary rule applies. "Character" is evidence of a person's traits and it may be highly relevant. But as a general proposition it is not admissible. When a person has a general trait that the State wants to use for its case in chief, a jury might mistakenly reason from the general to the particular. As indicated above, the State has the burden of proof. Character evidence is extremely dangerous because the jury might erroneously determine that the person acted in a particular way on a particular occasion that conforms with a general trait. The defendant, on the other hand, does not have to prove he did anything, and the rules of evidence recognize this with an exception to the rule against character. That is, an accused may offer pertinent evidence of his own character for the jury to consider. N.J.R.E. 404(a)(1). This allows the jury to reason from the general to the particular and conclude the defendant did not do the act of which he is accused. Even though this might be erroneous, the court allows the jury to make a mistake.

In this case, Mr. Ates wants to introduce evidence of his weight. This is classic character evidence because he wants the jury to find his general character for obesity prevented him from committing the act of murder as the State has alleged. Since he is the accused the rules clearly allow this evidence to be presented to a jury, and he is introducing it in his defense. Therefore, this relevant character evidence is admissible.

Finally, judges must weigh the value of the evidence against other concerns for the jury. More specifically, relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of (a) undue prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the jury or (b) undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. N.J.R.E. 403.

Here, the defense theory is factual impossibility. Namely, Mr. Ates could not possibly have killed his son-in-law. Due to his weight, he could not have run up the flight of stairs and accurately fired the weapon. The evidence of his weight, therefore, has tremendous weight, and there is no risk to its admission. Therefore, the evidence is admissible.

Obviously anyone who read the article already knows the jury heard this evidence. But those who do not know the law of evidence could not have known the analysis which the lawyers argued and the court engaged in before the evidence was presented.

State v. Edward Ates

[UPDATE #1: Closing arguments begin in NJ 'fat defense' case.]

[UPDATE #2: Jurors review evidence in NJ fat defense case.]

[UPDATE #3: NJ jurors convict Fla. man in 'fat defense' trial.]

Confrontation Clause and Prior Criminal History

"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . ." U.S. Const. amend. VI; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 10. The right of the accused to cross-examine derives from the Confrontation Clause. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). The Anglo-American tradition relishes live in-court testimony "by testing in the crucible of cross-examination." Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). Only by cross-examination can a defendant expose falsehood and bring out the truth in a criminal trial. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).

In a criminal trial, when it comes down to it, cross-examination is all the defendant really has. It is the one thing standing between the truth and the government's case in chief. This hallmark of great trial lawyers alerts the jury to holes the government might want to conceal.

But this right has limitations. The issue in the following case is whether the Confrontation Clause allows cross-examination to get into an adverse witness' criminal history. The Appellate Division held in this case that it does not. This was because the adverse witness was fully cross-examined in front of the jury about inconsistent statements, and his testimony was corroborated by evidence linking the defendant to the crime.

State v. Raafiq Leonard (App. Div. 2009).

Trial By Jury - A Cherished Right

It is hard to feel badly for William Oscar Harris. While under indictment for fraud Mr. Harris sent phony financial documents appearing to create liens and judgments against the judges and prosecutors involved in the trial.

When he refused to obey the court's order to stop, Mr. Harris was held in civil contempt and confined. This has not deterred Mr. Harris.

He was tried, convicted, and sentenced for the fraud charges. But the criminal sentence has been held in abeyance because Mr. Harris has not stopped his harrassing conduct. Under these facts his continued and indefinite incarceration for civil contempt is not unjustified. After all, he holds the keys to his prison cell.

That the prisoner challenged the contempt order reminded me of a child who would kill his parents and then plead for mercy as an orphan. In that regard, based on the facts of this case I understand the majority's absence of sympathy.

Then again when the facts are against you then argue the law, and here Mr. Harris argued the indefinite confinement violates due process. On that note, I could not help but think bad facts make bad law. Here the facts about Mr. Harris are certainly bad. But judges and courts are not above the law. This defendant has been incarcerated for over five years without a trial by jury. If this incarceration is to continue, it should only be upon the judgment of his peers.

United State v. Harris (3d Cir. 2009)

Peremptory Strikes - The Impartial Jury Right

Sex-based and race-based peremptory strikes are prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (prohibiting race based strikes); J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (prohibiting sex based strikes).

New Jersey law prohibits them primarily as a violation of the right to an impartial jury under N.J. Const. art. I ¶¶ 5, 9, and 10. Thus, the New Jersey judiciary prevents the U.S. Supreme Court from exercising appellate review because there is no subject matter jurisdiction, so long as state law provides at least the same protection as federal law.

Here, the N.J. Supreme Court adopts a modification under federal law for purposes of state law analysis. State v. Osorio. See also Comment, Criminal Procedure - The Quintessential Exercise of the Peremptory Challenge: Denial of Peremptory Strike Possibly Violates Section One of the Kentucky Constitution. Rutgers L.J. 1485 (2007) (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1143026).

Experienced New Jersey Criminal Defense Lawyer Michael Smolensky, Esquire, knows how to protect his clients. Mr. Smolensky can provide consultations on all cases regarding trials.

Call Now—(856) 812-0321.

www.smolenskylaw.com

Click "New Judicial Federalism," labeled in the post footer, for more examples and explanations about this topic.

Gang Violence and Criminal Law

This case involves the VICAR statute and addresses:
  1. voir dire as related to Fifth Amendment due process and Sixth Amendment impartial jury rights,
  2. proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
  3. federal rules of evidence 401 and 403, and
  4. sentencing.
United States v. Preston Jones a.k.a. Death (3rd Cir. 2009).

Tender Years Hearsay Exception and Confrontation Clause

A child's statements to her mother as to a sexual assault fell within the tender years hearsay exception and did not violate the right of confrontation. State v. Coder.

New Hearsay Exception

This case introduces a new hearsay exception in New Jersey - Forfeiture-By-Wrongdoing. It applies when a statement is offered against a party who has engaged, directly or indirectly, in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness. State v. Byrd

Dressed to the Nines

The Supreme Court of New Jersey exercises its supervisory powers under the State Constitution to impose a level playing field. As a general rule, corrections authorities should supply prison witnesses with civilian clothing and those witnesses should never appear in the courtroom in prison attire. State v. Paul Kuchera.