I blogged the other day about the cleric-penitent privilege based on the recent decision State of New Jersey v. J.G.
This opinion reminded me of a family court trial in Philadelphia I observed a couple of years ago. The evidence in that trial, in brief, implicated a group of male students who caused a very big commotion in their school. They were charged, among other things, with starting a riot.
The government's witnesses testified, and at the end of the trial the judge acquitted the boys for the riot offense. The Assistant District Attorney argued, citing the statutory elements of "riot" and insisting the testimony satisfied these requirements.
The judge responded succinctly, telling the A.D.A. he had obviously never witnessed a real riot. The debate on legislative intent ended there.
Justice Rivera-Soto's argues in his dissenting opinion here that the law should parallel a penitent's religion in affording a privilege in court. We are talking, after all, about the cleric-penitent privilege. Were it not for any participation in organized religion, the party would not be able to raise it.
Even in light of the majority opinion--based on statutory history, the legislative record, and canons of construction--the majority apparently ignored the title of the privilege. From this perspective, the majority analysis, impressive though it is, simply does not ring true.
State of New Jersey v. J.G.
Showing posts with label Cleric-Penitent Privilege. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Cleric-Penitent Privilege. Show all posts
Cleric-Penitent Privilege
The "Cleric-Penitent Privilege" has received recent coverage in some New Jersey media due to the recent decision in State of New Jersey v. J.G.
News reports indicated the Court's majority expanded the privilege because it adopted a new test to determine whether the privilege could be raised.
With its eponymous title suggesting a centuries old vintage, the Cleric-Penitent Privilege derives from the Code of Canon Law of the Roman Catholic Church. Canon Law not only criminalized breaking the seal of the confessional by a priest, but also emphasized the significance of this breach by imposing excommunication for revealing information acquired during a confession.
England, however, broke away from the Roman Catholic Church in the Sixteenth Century during the English Reformation, and likewise, English courts abandoned this privilege. As a result it was totally foreign to American Common Law.
Under New Jersey law, for example, there was no Cleric-Penitent Privilege until 1947. In that year the New Jersey legislature enacted it, and subsequently the government has amended this law.
It is no surprise, therefore, that the centerpiece of both the majority and the dissenting opinions in State v. J.G. consists of analysis using tools of statutory interpretation.
Courts employ tools of statutory interpretation to determine legislative intent and, accordingly, to apply the law. J.G. may pique one's interest because the majority and dissenting opinions apply similar tools to reach very different conclusions. And if the outcome is politically undesirable, the legislature can amend the statute.
State of New Jersey v. J.G.
News reports indicated the Court's majority expanded the privilege because it adopted a new test to determine whether the privilege could be raised.
With its eponymous title suggesting a centuries old vintage, the Cleric-Penitent Privilege derives from the Code of Canon Law of the Roman Catholic Church. Canon Law not only criminalized breaking the seal of the confessional by a priest, but also emphasized the significance of this breach by imposing excommunication for revealing information acquired during a confession.
England, however, broke away from the Roman Catholic Church in the Sixteenth Century during the English Reformation, and likewise, English courts abandoned this privilege. As a result it was totally foreign to American Common Law.
Under New Jersey law, for example, there was no Cleric-Penitent Privilege until 1947. In that year the New Jersey legislature enacted it, and subsequently the government has amended this law.
It is no surprise, therefore, that the centerpiece of both the majority and the dissenting opinions in State v. J.G. consists of analysis using tools of statutory interpretation.
Courts employ tools of statutory interpretation to determine legislative intent and, accordingly, to apply the law. J.G. may pique one's interest because the majority and dissenting opinions apply similar tools to reach very different conclusions. And if the outcome is politically undesirable, the legislature can amend the statute.
State of New Jersey v. J.G.
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